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Chapter 1: 
Taiwan’s Semiconductor Success: State and Network-led Development 
Taiwan is an island nation with a population less than Shanghai, but the island’s largest 
semiconductor firms, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (TSMC) and United 
Microelectronics (UMC), maintain more than half of the world’s semiconductor foundry market 
share.  Taiwan’s emerging economy is perhaps more distinguished than prominent late-comer 1
neighbors such as Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore, because it is the only economy to not only 
catch-up within a high tech industry such as semiconductors, but also produce at the cutting edge 
of industry innovation.  Taiwan’s semiconductor industry success is well matched with the life 
and career of recently retired TSMC Chairman and CEO Morris Chang. Mr. Chang was one of 
Taiwan’s first generation of engineers studying in the United States, where he earned degrees in 
Mechanical Engineering from M.I.T, as well as a PhD in electrical engineering from Stanford 
University. He spent the majority of his early career working for Texas Instruments as a senior 
 Clair Brown and Greg Linden, “Crisis 2: Rising Cost of Fabrication.” in Chips and Change : How Crisis Reshapes 1
the Semiconductor Industry, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2009), 39.
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Vice President overseeing semiconductor production. After years of attaining and absorbing 
knowledge, business practices and know-how, in 1985 Chang shifted his attention homeward by 
serving as the Chairman for Taiwan’s Industrial Technology Research Institute. TSMC was 
officially created in 1987 as a joint venture between the Taiwan government (ITRI), the Dutch 
multinational corporation (MNC) Phillips, as well as private investors, with Chang leaving ITRI 
to lead the new venture. Chang claims the establishment of TSMC “ushered in a new era in the 
electronics industry-that of the dedicated silicon foundry.”  2
 While Chang’s inception of the foundry-fabless organization of the semiconductor supply 
chain indeed manifested into a reality, one should also consider political and economic structural 
factors supporting the establishment of TSMC and the foundry-fabless style of production. 
Certainly, the fragmentation of global production and business trends like outsourcing and the 
vertical disintegration of industries helped Taiwan’s foundry sector success. Additionally, 
scholars like Anna Lee Saxenian suggest the connections and know-how Chang and other 
returnee entrepreneurs attained abroad (Network-led), is more important for Taiwan’s 
semiconductor success than the industrial and State policy of Taiwan (State-led). Which factor is 
more important for Taiwan achieving and maintaining the technological cutting edge in 
semiconductor fabrication, and did this dramatic change in organized production influence the 
State’s ability to impact development decisions? In other words, how is Taiwan’s ability to direct 
development impacted by the vertical disintegration of the global semiconductor industry, and 
where is the center of development decision making power located? 
 M Chang, “Foundry Future: Challenges in the 21st Century,” 2007 IEEE International Solid-State Circuits 2
Conference. Digest of Technical Papers, San Francisco, CA, pp. 18-23.
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Literature Review 
 To most scholars, explanations for high-tech development in late emerging economies are 
either founded in an emphasis on State-led policy initiatives and infrastructure providing private 
enterprises the necessary inputs for innovation, or a focus on transnational networks of industry 
links, as well as the influx of a market economy attempting to find the correct market prices. 
Within the context of Taiwan, political economist Dan Breznitz argues the ‘Innovation State’ 
primarily deserves credit for the successful semiconductor foundry sector in Taiwan due to initial 
research development initiatives of public research consortia, such as ITRI and Electronic 
Research Service Organization (ERSO), creating spin-off companies like United 
Microelectronics (UMC) and TSMC, as well as initially attaining foreign technology for IC 
fabrication from firms like RCA. While Breznitz largely credits the Taiwanese government for 
the initial development of the nation’s semiconductor industry, significantly he adds that 
continued development is in part due to the State’s willingness and ability to give up 
development decisions once a relatively strong private sector semiconductor foundry industry 
emerged.  In other words, he claims the Taiwanese State focused on aiding and upgrading 3
domestic firm development and capabilities, specifically the physical manufacturing of 
semiconductor chips, in order for these firms to attain the technological level and leverage 
needed for firm to firm interactions when entering the global semiconductor industry. Breznitz 
credits State policy for actively targeting these MNC’s and points to policies such as the 
 Dan Breznitz, “The Development of the IT Industry in Taiwan: Public Research Institutions as Growth Impetus?” 3
in Innovation and the State: Political Choice and Strategies for Growth in Israel, Taiwan, and Ireland (New Haven; 
London: Yale University Press, 2007), 99.
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establishment of the world’s first export-processing-zone and favorable tax incentives initially 
attracting top foreign firms, such as Dutch MNC Phillips, to Taiwan. These policies undoubtedly 
incentivized firms to move production to Taiwan, but without strong domestic firm capabilities 
there is no incentive for firms to move focus away from relative low labor costs assembly and 
testing stages of production. The most important factors in Taiwan’s high-tech semiconductor 
development is not favorable tax policies or low environmental standards, but instead are 
domestic firms ability to transition from low-end tech activity to achieving the global 
technological cutting edge.  
  
State Driven Theories of Development  
 In the following section, we will analyze the arguments of prominent Statist literatures as 
well as State-driven development arguments tailored specifically for Taiwan’s high-tech 
industries. In an attempt to provide nuanced understandings and complex analysis of Breznitz’ 
and other claims, we will address their claims with no abstention of prominent criticisms. We 
will compare Breznitz’ arguments with alternative theories for high-tech development, like 
Saxenian’s network led theory, and find if they are in contradiction and or agreement with each 
other.  
 Breznitz’s theoretical framework largely stems from and is supported by literature of the 
developmental state. Stephen Haggard in his book Developmental States looks at the relationship 
between intervention and growth in developing economies. Statist literature, including 
Haggard’s, claims state action can overcome weak areas of either market failure, technology 
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transfer, adoption and learning. The positive relationship Haggard claims to exist offers 
theoretical evidence to explain the practical success of Taiwan’s semiconductor industry and 
supports Breznitz’ argument “the state (Taiwan) itself, acting as the technology-creating agent, 
has spurred the growth of the IT sector… by embedding public research institutions within the 
technology-creating sector.”  ITRI is the most successful of these public research institutes and 4
served a variety of functions for developing Taiwan’s semiconductor industry. For example, ITRI 
facilitated technical cooperation with domestic private enterprises for development of key 
technologies, as well as training highly qualified personal, expanding research links with 
institutions abroad and maintaining close relations between various universities and R&D 
organizations within Taiwan.  While the Taiwanese State directed these public research institutes 5
to train a high-skilled workforce and other initiatives, the relative success of the personal and 
firms they create cannot solely be attributed to Taiwan's government policy. One must take a 
closer look at the national, educational and professional backgrounds of the individual actors and 
their personal networks before offering conclusions regarding the impact of State directives. 
 Additionally, Breznitz credits state attention towards building a local supplier network of 
firms for MNC’s as a major reason for Taiwan’s successful assimilation into the larger global IT 
ecosystem.   In other words, Breznitz gives credit to the State for encouraging firms to carve 6
specialized niches in the IT and semiconductor supply chain, and integrating themselves into 
global supply chains. While true Taiwan developed a significant local supplier network for both 
domestic and foreign firms, did this development occur due to specific State policy actions, or 
 Dan Breznitz, Innovation and the State, 98.4
 Walter Arnold, “Science and Technology Development in Taiwan and South Korea,”  Asian Survey (1988): 447.5
 Dan Breznitz, Innovation and the State, 100.6
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did individual firms and personal's recognition of industry trends, like vertical disintegration of 
production, spawn the influx of specialized component producers? While Taiwan’s 
semiconductor industry had a large local supplier network, Breznitz’ claim overlooks the 
potential relevance of individual engineers, CEOs, and founders of the large local supplier 
network developing both local and global industry networks for knowledge transfer, thereby 
spurring innovation. 
  Breznitz claims Taiwan’s public research institutes helped to form the strategy of basing 
Taiwan’s semiconductor industry off achieving capabilities to modularly produce chips—instead 
of focusing on more capital-intensive memory chip markets, which at the time faced intense 
competition from high tech-giants; the U.S, Japan, and Korea.  Significantly, Breznitz mentions 7
that these policy decisions are largely influenced by American advisors with the United States 
Department for International Aid (USAID). These advisors recognized global business trends of 
outsourcing and de-verticalization of organized production, which globalization catalyzed, and 
sought to create an industry in Taiwan to complement these global trends, while at the same time 
providing massive benefits for entrenched firms of advanced industrial nations, like the United 
States. Breznitz also claims the result of these initial policy directives, and other State provided 
inputs, like physical infrastructure, initial capital investments and education, led to the early 
success of State spinoff UMC as well as later leading to ERSO privatizing the construction of a 
“VLSI fabrication facility employing an innovative business model—the pureplay foundry.”  8
Breznitz also points to successful semiconductor foundry firms—Vanguard and Winbond, who 
 Dan Breznitz, Innovation and the State, 109. 7
 Ibid., 110. 8
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were spin-offs of public domain projects—as additional evidence to support his claim of the 
State's central role in developing the industry.   9
 A criticism of Breznitz and others' claims of the central role of the State in Taiwan’s high-
tech semiconductor development is the literature of absorptive capacity. Absorptive capacity is 
defined as a firms ability to absorb knowledge and produce innovative products with ideas 
accessed through shared knowledge pools.  Political-economist Anthony Howell argues that 10
high levels of state intervention has a negative relationship with domestic firms absorptive 
capacity.  Howell continues by claiming specifically State-led and top-down policy initiatives 11
tend to result in issues of group-think; causing inefficient repetition of ideas and reducing 
outside-the-box and risk taking behavior that typically characterizes innovative activity.  12
Perhaps this criticism of Breznitz’ argument suggests his emphasis on the State transitioning its 
role from active leader, to a decentralized supportive role, is a response to Howell and others 
points around absorptive capacity. Additionally, the well-documented cases of developmental 
state economies in Korea and Japan provide counter-evidence that high levels of State 
involvement in economic development decisions reduce innovation and successful high-tech 
catching up.   13
 Douglas Fuller in his article “The Cross-Strait Economic Relationship’s impact on 
Development in Taiwan and China: Adversaries and Partners” explores the dynamic and 
 Dan Breznitz, Innovation and the State, 110.9
 Cohen and Levinthal, 1990.10
 Anthony Howell, “Relatedness economies, absorptive capacity, and economic catch-up: firmlevel evidence from 11
China,” Industrial and Corporate Change (2019): 3.
Anthony Howell, “Relatedness economies, absorptive capacity, and economic catch-up: firmlevel evidence from 12
China,” Industrial and Corporate Change (2019): 4.
 Daedrick and Kraemer (2002). 13
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changing cross-strait economic relationship—with a specific focus on the impact to Taiwan’s 
electronics sector including semiconductors. Fuller largely concurs with Breznitz that State 
policy facilitated the acquisition of necessary inputs for the inception and initial ‘start-up’ phase 
of the industry.   However, significantly he states “although the Taiwanese State originally 14
created both TSMC and UMC, the continued competitiveness of its semiconductor fabrication 
has had little to do with government policy beyond preferential tax treatment.”  Fuller points to 15
other forward looking State-policy methods, like the recruitment of MNC R&D centers to 
Taiwan, as one factor helping Taiwan maintain a competitive advantage in high-tech 
manufacturing.  Additionally, similar to Breznitz, Fuller credits entrenched and efficient 16
communicative links between Taiwanese local suppliers and leading domestic firms. These 
industry networks represent significant barriers to entry for late-coming firms in other emerging 
economies without access to Taiwan’s diverse local component supplier network, like China. 
Despite Fuller crediting the importance of industry connections, Fuller continues by largely 
crediting Breznitz’ theory of ITRI model of technological upgrading within the semiconductor 
industry, as well as other successful Taiwanese tech industries, like automotive.  
Network Driven Development in Taiwan’s Semiconductor Industry 
  Douglas, Fuller, “The Cross-Strait Economic Relationship's Impact on Development,” in Taiwan and China: 14
Adversaries and Partners, Asian Survey 48 (2008), 252. 
Ibid., 252.15
 Ibid., 255. 16
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 In the following section, we will discuss and analyze the arguments for a network-driven 
model of success stemming from the personal and professional networks of Taiwan’s returnee 
entrepreneurs. Additionally, we will discuss technical factors contributing to the disintegration of 
vertical production and the creation of the fabless/fab model of semiconductor production. We 
will attempt to engage in a dialogue between State-driven and network driven arguments to 
understand whether or not the arguments are ultimately in contradiction with each-other.   
 Anna Lee Saxenian’s book The New Argonauts: Regional Advantage in a Global 
Economy shifts away from an analytical focus on the role of the state, large corporations and 
domestic firms integration, replaced with analysis of global production networks for evaluating 
Taiwan’s high-tech semiconductor industry growth.  While she recognizes State factors as 17
supporting actors for high-tech development, her central claim is “entrepreneurs and their far-
flung networks now play a vital role in the technology industries’ global expansion—and make 
an increasingly important contribution to economic growth and development more broadly.”  In 18
the case of Taiwan, Saxenian claims while the public sector has played a role in the governance 
of the industrial system, “Taiwan’s policymakers do not direct this process of technological and 
industrial upgrading, and institutions like ITRI and ERSO have limited control over the pace and 
direction of innovation in domestic industry.”  Instead, Saxenian argues that ethnic Chinese 19
U.S.- based engineers—due to shared bonds of cultural background, a diverse web of 
professional networks in cross-regional and local industry networks, as well as various public 
 Anna Lee Saxenian, “Taiwan as Silicon Sibling,” in The New Argonauts: Regional Advantage in a Global 17
Economy, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), 130
 Anna Lee Saxenian, The New Argonauts, 100. 18
 Ibid., 132. 19
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and private sector advisory committees and business associations assisting in networking events
—facilitate the rapid diffusion of business and technical knowledge inputs necessary for 
producing at the innovative edge. In other words, by accessing accumulated industry knowledge 
sources, key individuals and expertise—such as the advantage of specialization in a volatile and 
technological uncertain environment— Taiwan positioned the domestic semiconductor industry 
for rapid success.   While Breznitz mentions the influence of “American advisors” when 20
guiding ERSOs development decisions for the privatization of VLSI technology, he mainly 
focuses on the fact the decision comes from within the public sector. He does not offer a complex 
account of key actors backgrounds and connections within public sector institutions, which 
Saxenian suggests come closer to identifying the source for the dynamic shift in organized 
industrial production occurring in Taiwan’s semiconductor industry.  
 Clair Brown and Greg Linden, in their book Chips and Change: How Crisis Reshapes the 
Semiconductor Industry, offer an alternative perspective to Taiwan’s semiconductor success. 
Their analytical approach is based on the technical factors that lead to the industry wide re-
organization of production, i.e. vertical disintegration. The authors discuss two main technical 
innovations that allowed for the breaking off between design and manufacturing: the digitization 
and transmission of design—perfected during early 1980s specifically with the Berekely 
Transistor Simulation Model (BSIM) —which allowed for design (fabless) firms to effectively 
transmit their chip designs to foundry firms located on the other side of the Pacific— as well as 
the solidification of the Metal Oxide Semiconductor (CMOS) process as the mainstream method 
of fabrication technology, which created a “predictable technology trajectory for designers to 
 Ibid., 133. 20
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target.”  As a result of these technical innovations, it became profitable for vertically integrated 21
firms to begin outsourcing more capital intensive stages of production, like physical fabrication, 
to the emerging semiconductor foundry sector. Additionally, advanced fabless design firms no 
longer feared outsourcing their innovative chip designs to the foundry firms due to foundry firms 
inability to take the designs and develop their own chip designs based off their customers. In 
other words, the de-verticalizaiton of industry reduced intellectual property disputes for fabless 
designers as they were no longer forced to turn to their competitors (large integrated IC firms) 
for the fabrication of their chip.  When focusing our analysis, we must look closely at whether 
Taiwan’s pureplay-foundry sector grew out of these technical innovations, or grew in 
anticipation of them.  
 Brown and Linden also discuss important characteristics of the semiconductor industry 
such as the level of the semiconductor industry’s interconnectedness, even between different 
aspects of technological development. While semiconductor fabrication is itself an industry, 
pureplay-foundry firms heavily rely on separate technological advancement such as advancing 
lithographic capabilities. In fact, 20% of the cost to produce a cutting edge foundry is the price of 
lithography tools and equipment for fabrication.  This dynamic highlights the importance of 22
developing cross-industry connections to different aspects of the supply and value chain, which 
also supports Saxenian’s network-model approach for development. 
 Sue Ching Joe and Dung-Sheng Chen in their journal article “Keeping the high-tech 
region open and dynamic: the organizational networks of Taiwan’s integrated circuit industry” 
 Clair Brown and Greg Linden, Chips and Change, 47.21
 Clair Brown and Greg Linden, Chips and Change, 40.22
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explore the relevance of both domestic and external industry links that provide “channels for 
companies to gain market information, customers, technology, and capital.”  The authors 23
gathered empirical evidence by collecting data on the top 32 IC firms in the Hsinchu Science and 
Industry Park region and identifying key actions taken by these firms that had an impact on 
organizational development.  These “organizational events” occur both intra-firm, inter-firm and  24
firm to external groups like trade associations. This paper adds a layer of support for Saxenian’s 
argument on the central importance of network-led development. Significantly, the number of 
organizational connections increased rapidly during the late 80s and 90s, when private firms 
began to lead the semiconductor industry. Although this paper specifically mentions the 
important role ITRI and ERSO held during the early 
stages of semiconductor development, the number of 
events dramatically increased when these organizations 
were no longer as relevant. Additionally, this paper 
highlights the importance of having both regional and 
global cross-industry connections as over 50% of these 
‘organizational events’ occurred within Taiwan. The 
concentration of events in the U.S.A is notable because 
it supports Saxenian's claim that specifically U.S. based 
ethnically Chinese engineers play a prominent role in 
the diffusion of knowledge to Taiwanese industry.  
 Sue-Ching, Joe and Dung-Sheng Chen. “Keeping the High-Tech Region Open and Dynamic: the Organizational 23
Networks of Taiwan's Integrated Circuit Industry,” GeoJournal 53, (2001): 81.
 Sue-Ching, Joe and Dung-Sheng Chen. “Keeping the High-Tech Region Open and Dynamic: (2001): 82.24
Jou, Sue-Ching, and Dung-Sheng Chen. “Keeping the High-Tech Region 
Open and Dynamic: the Organizational Networks of Taiwan's Integrated 
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 Breznitz may disagree with Saxenian’s emphasis on individual entrepreneurs and their 
professional networks primarily contributing to the development of Taiwan’s semiconductor 
industry because how can a network-centered approach explain the different development 
trajectories of Taiwan’s hardware and software industries, which he claims is due to differences 
in the bureaucratic structures of public research consortia like ITRI and the Institution for 
Information Industry. Breznitz claims III’s agendas—to promote Taiwan’s software industry 
while also generating enough revenue to cover its own expenses—proved to be in conflict, with 
the end result that III has been competing directly with (Taiwan’s) private software firms.  25
Additionally, he suggests “because III had captured the big governmental contracts, and the big 
global IT industries were competing directly on big projects, the industry was unable to develop 
big software houses specializing in customized development.”  In response, Saxenian may 26
suggest that by encouraging III to reach profitability, while also giving the institution generous 
government contracts and other benefits, the government policy aims to create a “national 
champion" rather than the “natural champion" approach seen in the semiconductor industry. 
Additionally, Saxenian may also suggest the issue is not a result of state policy creating 
conflicting agendas within a public research consortia, but instead is a failure to catalyze cross-
regional connections. Owing to III's setting an industry direction to directly compete with top 
foreign software firms, this disincentives foreign firms to contract out higher value added 
activities with sensitive intellectual property information. If firms are attempting to directly 
compete, rather than complement, the existing software industry within advanced industrial 
 Dan Breznitz, Innovation and the State, 131.25
 Ibid., 131. 26
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economies, then it is likely to create a cooling effect on Taiwan’s domestic industry cooperation 
with foreign firms. In other words, while good state policy can aid indigenous development of 
high-tech innovation, poor state policy derails indigenous development by interrupting the 
mutual positive feedback loop associated with carving a niche in the global division of labor, 
which results from connecting innovative and global leading firms with complementary 
secondary innovators. Due to less global industry interaction with Taiwan's domestic firms, 
Saxenian may suggest her brain circulating cross-regional networks are put on freeze due to 
intense local and global competition.   
 Breznitz is not alone in placing the central credit for Taiwan’s semiconductor success in 
the hands of State technocrats. In Mathew's and Cho’s article “ A Silicon Valley of the East” and 
again in their book “Tiger Technologies” in terms of successful high-tech development, they 
largely credits Taiwan’s technocrat in chief Premier Y. S. Sun and his recruiting efforts in the 70s 
of ethnic Chinese engineers in leading positions within U.S firms to make up the personal of the 
Technical Advisory Committee (TAC), as well as later on the Science and Technology Advisory 
Group (STAG). He claims the TAC framed recommendations for starting a new semiconductor 
industry within Taiwan, under the auspices of ITRI, which lead to the creation of ERSO and that 
organizations agenda for developing “the technological capabilities needed to generate a 
semiconductor industry.”  Cho and Mathews continue by claiming ERSO’s technological 27
development and initial public sector capital expenditures led to successful technological 
upgrading, and eventual knowledge diffusion, into the local private industry.   He specifically 28
 Dong-Sung Cho and John Mathews, “A Cat Can Look at a King: How Taiwan Did it,” in Tiger Technologies: The 27




credits the TAC's recommendation for developing CMOS technology for fabrication as “a far-
sighted decision given its subsequent significance as dominant semiconductor manufacturing 
technology.  Significantly, they mention that ERSO was unable to secure a foreign MNC for the 29
initial technology acquisition of fabrication technology until “under the influence of Dr. Pan, 
then working for the US electronics firm RCA, ERSO was successful in signing a technology 
transfer agreement with RCA.”   While Mathews and Cho seem to give credit to Dr. Pan, he 30
does not open his analytical approach to account for the significance of Dr. Pan’s professional 
connections to RCA and the global semiconductor industry in regards to ERSO’s initial 
technology acquisition. Saxenian may suggest without key individuals private networks, it's 
difficult to determine whether any of ERSO’s acquisition initiatives would have left initial 
planning. 
 Mathews and Cho credit STAG as well as the National Science Council (NSC) 
specifically for recommending the creation of the Hsinchu Science Park, which has historically 
played the role of intra-industry and inter-firm connector, as well as continues today to house 
Taiwan’s most advanced semiconductor and IC firms. Funding for the HSP was largely State 
provided, and soon after completion pubic consortia, like ERSO and ITRI, located their 
development initiatives in the park. Significantly, Cho fails to mention that all 15 of STAG were 
recruited from the United States, where technology based clusters like Silicon Valley were 
already the predominant and preferred method of industrial spatial-organization.  Essentially, 31
Saxenian suggests that although these important policy decisions facilitated key developments in 
 Ibid., 164.29
 Dong-Sung Cho and John Mathews, Tiger Technologies, 165.30
 Anna Lee Saxenian, The New Argonauts, 143.31
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the upgrading of Taiwan's semiconductor technology, “reliance on U.S.-based engineers for 
technical and managerial experience and policy advice fundamentally shaped the direction and 
pace of Taiwan's technology development.”   In other words, while the policy decisions came 32
from within the public sector, in reality a network-based model for development—seen through 
the STAG and TAC members professional backgrounds and networks—  lead to the insightful 
and far-reaching policy decisions of Taiwan’s public research consortia and leading technocrats. 
 The proposal for the HSP was part of a larger initiative to attract foreign investment in 
Taiwan’s research-oriented companies, but at first the park failed to attract large MNCs industry 
activity. Despite the park serving as “a high-technology version of an export-processing-zone, 
one that offered subsidized land and financial incentives for R&D intensive manufacturing 
tenants,” technology-intensive R&D firms were not persuaded to move their high-tech 
manufacturing operations to the park.  Taiwan’s bureaucrats sought out a different method of 33
catalyzing development in the park, and did so by promoting the introduction of private venture 
capital firms to Taiwan. Saxenian may suggest without changes in the financial regulatory 
structure—-Taiwan historically restricted financial decisions based off a patriarchal system 
where family members closely controlled businesses financial affairs—as well as without initial 
State-led efforts to recruit senior Chinese-American financiers to establish VC firms in Taiwan, 
then the Hscinchu Science Park may not have succeeded in becoming “an open laboratory for the 
growth of indigenous technology firms.   34
 Ibid., 143. 32
 Anna Lee Saxenian, The New Argonauts, 144. 33
 Ibid., 147. 34
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 Breznitz also credits the introduction of private VC firms as an important factor 
supplying the capital necessary for launching semiconductor firms and enhancing these firms 
R&D capabilities. However, he diverges from Saxenian by claiming “Li’s and subsequent 
government initiatives have taken great care to make sure the Taiwanese VC industry stays 
Taiwanese, devoting all their attention to motivating local investor participation.”  While 35
Saxenian admits much of the financing for Taiwan’s initial VC firms came from within existing 
Taiwanese industry, she would also highlight the significant impact of U.S.-educated overseas 
Chinese engineers, like Peter Liu and Lip-Bu Tan, who established Taiwan’s second U.S.-style 
venture fund, the Walden International Investment Group.”  Significantly, Saxenian and 36
Breznitz again diverge on the role and impact of State regulatory decisions, pertaining finance 
and financial options, in regard to employee stock-options, designed to attract and maintain high-
value talent.  
 Breznitz argues that owing to the structure of Taiwan’s financial regulations, which only 
allows employee stock options for firms who are already public, the structure incentivizes top 
engineering talent to enter the employment of entrenched firms like TSMC and UMC. In turn, 
this reduces the flow of top IT engineering talent towards smaller firms with more specialized 
and riskier development strategies; thereby reducing first-generation technology innovation.   37
Saxenian may agree that these policies create a fast-track for engineers to enter Taiwan’s top 
firms, but simultaneously these favorable financial policies, which also include the elimination of 
any capital gains tax, resulted in a massive influx of ethnic returnee engineers and 
 Dan Breznitz, Innovation and the State, 141.35
 Anna Lee Saxenian, The New Argonauts, 147.36
 Dan Breznitz, Innovation and the State, 140. 37
Farley !19
entrepreneurs.  Oftentimes these returnees enter an entrenched pureplay- foundry model firm 38
like TSMC or UMC, and after earning significant profits, leaves to create a new firm or become 
part of a spin-off firm that continues to carve out niches in a global division of secondary-
generation complementary technology. While Breznitz is concerned that the structure of this 
financial incentive system will reduce the likelihood of Taiwanese firms developing first-
generation technologies, Saxenian suggests that attracting the most talented engineers and 
bringing the most advanced human capital to Taiwan will result in a continuous process of firms 
finding new niches in the global division of labor. In fact, returnees made up 42% of the 
positions on founding teams for firms located in the Hsinchu Science Park in 2000.  In other 39
words, while these firms may act as complements to existing innovative industry in high-tech 
economies of advanced industrial nations, they continue to enhance the overall economies 
technological level.   
Conclusions 
 Breznitz vision of the ‘Innovation State’ and Saxenian’s account of  returnee entrepreneur 
network-led development are not in direct opposition to each other. Both authors recognize 
similar trends and factors leading to the development of Taiwan’s semiconductor pureplay-
foundry sector, but they fail to cohesively connect their complementary narratives. Taiwanese 
State institutions, like ITRI, ERSO, NSC, TAC, and STAG as well as State financial policies, 
 Anna Lee Saxenian, The New Argonauts, 149. 38
 Anna Lee Saxenian, The New Argonauts, 150. 39
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regarding venture capital and the financial regulatory structure, undoubtedly facilitated the 
development of Taiwan’s semiconductor industry and continues to hold nominal levels of 
development decision making power. However, these institutions and policies alone are 
incapable of offering a complete picture of Taiwan’s semiconductor industry success.   
 Additionally, U.S-educated Taiwanese entrepreneurs, like Morris Chang, Dr. Wen Yuan 
Pan and Dr. Ding-Yuan Yang, as well as others in key positions within Taiwan’s technocratic 
class, provided industry expertise, connections and know-how from the leading semiconductor 
and IT firms to Taiwan’s domestic industry. Without these entrepreneurs Taiwan’s semiconductor 
development would have gone without managerial and technical expert guidance, as well as 
policy advice. Additionally, without the connections to IT and semiconductor firms to the United 
States, which the U.S-based engineers brought with them, then Taiwan’s semiconductor industry 
would have struggled to integrate themselves into a complementary position within the global 
division of labor.  
 Breznitz is correct that State policy deserves credit for Taiwan’s semiconductor 
development, but he does not accurately depict the reasons why State policy was successful. 
Taiwan’s State policy aimed to expand their technological level within semiconductor 
manufacturing by actively targeting Saxenian’s network-led model of development. Likewise, 
these returnee entrepreneurs and their networks aided Taiwan’s government facilitating the 
development of the semiconductor industry from within the public sector. Neither State industrial 
policy nor Saxenian’s network of transnational elites could accomplish the striking success of 
Taiwan’s semiconductor industry without the other. Despite this fact, there are differences 
between some of Taiwan’s top semiconductor firms that are a product of different development 
Farley !21
influences. Some of Taiwan’s domestic firms have origins stemming from the state, some have 
semi-state origins and others have completely private VC origins. Although both Breznitz and 
Saxenian’s development explanations are complementary and unable to exist without the other, 
one may suspect differences in terms of the ability for a firm to produce at the cutting 
technological edge in relationship with the firm origins. The next chapter will first look at the 
timing of Taiwan’s key policy initiatives and decisions in relation to domestic firms development 
decisions and global outsourcing and de-verticalization trends, as well as evaluate the direct 
impact of these decisions on both Taiwan’s semiconductor industry as a whole, as well as a few 
key semiconductor firms within Taiwan.  
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Chapter 2     
 State-Driven Innovation in Taiwan’s Semiconductor Industry 
  
 Our discussion will now turn to the State public research consortia, policy initiatives, 
advisory groups, and other public inputs Breznitz, Mathews and Cho, Fuller and others point to 
as drivers of Taiwan’s semiconductor advancement. We will discuss how certain State-led actions 
helped forge a path forward for Taiwan’s semiconductor industry, as well as actions supporting 
the relationships, incentives and other public inputs necessary for foreign technological 
acquisition and domestic technological upgrading. Finally, we will focus our analysis on how 
certain State-oriented actions impacted firms with state, semi-state and non-state origins 
development decisions within the pureplay- foundry semiconductor sector, firms which other 
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scholars like Breznitz and Saxenian target as a topic for empirical analysis. To provide the reader 
with a better understanding of Taiwan’s domestic industry and the history of State driven 
development, we will begin the chapter with a brief historical background of Taiwan.  
Historical Context for the Development of the Modern Taiwan State 
 As discussed previously, Breznitz’ state-driven argument is largely founded in a vast 
literature describing the developmental state. Additionally, Taiwan’s specific historical context, 
even before the Kuomintang rise to power in 1949, has largely been a result of layers of heavy-
handed government industrial policy. Under Japanese occupation, there were efforts to transform 
the colony into a modern state; “Japanese colonialists introduced what were at the time modern 
railways, a modern telephone and communications grid, a modern banking system, a highly 
developed commercial market network, an effective public health system…even more important 
was the expansion of literacy and technical training.”   Following occupation, Taiwan 40
essentially operated under the undivided authority of Jiang Jieshi who achieved unity, though by 
objectionable methods, which allowed modernizing bureaucrats more room to maneuver in 
promoting industrialization and “gave capitalists confidence in the security of their investment in 
Taiwan’s industry.”  During the first 30-40 years of Taiwan’s development, Economic planning 41
remained firmly in control of the State, as well as within foreign allied development institutions 
like USAID. In addition to serving traditional government roles like macroeconomic monetary 
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and fiscal policy decisions, Taiwan’s prominent technocrats  K. T. Li and K. Y. Lin, “believed in 
the important role of government in helping to acquire technology, allocate funds for key 
projects, and guide the development of the economy.”  These bureaucrats were observers of 42
their fellow East Asian late developers and utilized similar protectionist policies quite common 
within developmental states. Some example policies included protection of infant industries from 
foreign competition, limiting the extent of foreign control in Taiwanese business, implementing 
component requirements for firms intending to sell within Taiwan's domestic market, as well as 
targeting sectors with growing wage demands within developed economies.  43
 Catalyzing Taiwan’s industrial development resulted in the creation of new state firms in 
key areas such as steel, shipbuilding, electric power and nuclear power. While private industry 
slowly was integrated into the system, the government largely held a monopoly over the 
availability of credit, and had a large impact on picking the winners of development projects.  44
Significantly, the Taiwanese financial system—which limits patient capital—is in stark contrast 
to Gerschenkron and the developmental state models, which emphasize the need for capital rich 
long-term loans often coming from the State.   Essentially, the State took responsibility and 45
control over the upgrading of basic upstream industries, as well as infrastructure, in order to 
supply the necessary inputs for private industry to thrive. This determination to protect Taiwan’s 
infant industries, introduce new technologies, and minimize foreign investment helped local 
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firms gain strength and avoid displacement by foreign MNCs.  For much of Taiwan’s early 46
development, Taiwan followed a slightly deviated developmental state model and filled a lead 
role in guiding development decisions, as well as providing the necessary inputs for domestic 
firms to succeed. With an understanding of Taiwan’s historical context, one can understand why 
Breznitz’s analysis of Taiwan’s high-tech semiconductor manufacturing industry tends to 
continue to view development primarily through the lens of State institutions and policies.  
 The initial arrival of the semiconductor industry in Taiwan started when foreign firms 
began to outsource testing and assembly stages of production during the 1960s.  At that time 47
Taiwan’s labor wage rates were significantly lower than the advanced industrialist economies. 
Low wages combined with the stability of strong KMT rule meant for MNCs Taiwan was an 
attractive nation to locate production. Additionally, Taiwan created the first Export Processing 
Zone (EPZ) which offered tax incentives and eased labor regulations for foreign firms. As a 
result a few U.S. semiconductor firms to moved their test and assembly stages of production to 
Taiwan. While generally the EPZ should be considered a success, as it provided employment 
opportunities for Taiwanese, assembly and testing stages of production does not require 
sophisticated manufacturing technology; therefore, the EPZ was unsuccessful in upgrading 
Taiwan’s technological level.    48
 The 1970s brought many major shocks to the established global order and it was during 
this period that Taiwan’s bureaucrats began initiatives for major industrial and technological 
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upgrading. While not directly connected to Taiwan’s plan for establishing more high-tech 
industries, the fall of the Bretton Woods System, the Oil Shock of 1973, increasing neo-
protectionist measures from advanced industrial economies and rising competition from other 
low-cost labor economies made it clear to Taiwan’s bureaucrats that maintaining an economy 
located in low-value added segments of the supply chain was increasingly unsustainable.  Some 49
scholars have argued it was Taiwan’s unique response to the economic challenges in the 70s that 
differentiated the developmental style from similar late-developers such as Korea. The State’s 
response to these challenges in the 70s marks the beginning of our analysis, which focuses on the 
role of Taiwan’s government in the remarkable success of the semiconductor fabrication industry.  
State Policies and Semiconductor Initiatives 
 Our discussion will now turn to the State public research consortia, policy initiatives, 
advisory groups, and other public inputs Breznitz, Cho, Fuller and others point to as drivers of 
Taiwan’s semiconductor advancement. We will discuss how certain State-led actions helped 
forge a path forward for Taiwan’s semiconductor industry, as well as actions supporting the 
relationships, incentives and other public inputs necessary for foreign technological acquisition 
and domestic technological upgrading. Finally, we will focus our analysis on how certain State-
oriented actions impacted firms with state, semi-state and non-state origins development 
decisions within the pureplay- foundry semiconductor sector, firms which other scholars like 
Breznitz and Saxenian target as a topic for empirical analysis.    
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 Breznitz and others like Hong Sul claim that Taiwan’s public research consortia, ERSO 
and ITRI, led the fledgling semiconductor industry forward when capital sources were limited 
and technological levels low. The literature universally points to the meeting of Dr. Y.H Sun and 
Dr. Wen-yuan Pan, in August 1974, as a crucial starting point for the inception of these 
consortia.  Initially, as a result of the meeting, the organization ITRI was created. ITRI became a 50
central supporter of foreign technology acquisition for the first steps of Taiwan’s semiconductor 
industry development. Interestingly, rather than selecting prominent State bureaucrats to lead the 
push into high-tech electronics, Sun targeted ethnic Chinese engineers working in the U.S to lead 
the push into the semiconductor industry and placed them in  key positions within Technical 
Advisory Commitee. The structure of the State policy, specifically the makeup of the TAC, 
suggests attempts to incorporate the connections of these engineers within the policy decision 
process. The TAC recommended ERSO’s creation in 1974 “whose head was immediately 
charged with the task of developing the technological capabilities needed to generate a 
semiconductor industry.”  ERSO successfully found a leading edge firm in RCA, which 51
willingly transferred their abandoned and out-of-date 7-micron CMOS semiconductor fabrication 
technology.  
 According to Cho, when the TAC prepared a report for the Taiwan cabinet on their 
proposal to create a semiconductor industry, one of the requests was “CMOS was to be the 
technology of choice.”  Although CMOS technology was invented in 1963 by Frank Winless, 52
CMOS technology did not become mainstream until the introduction of the 256Kb CMOS 
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DRAM in 1984, which followed the decision of ERSO to focus developing CMOS process 
technology.  Mathews and Cho argue “the capacity to ‘read’ technological trajectories provides 53
one of the critical points of leverage that latecomers need in order to effect entry.”  This 54
decision was not based off of any ‘latecomer’ advantages as Gerschenkron may suggest, but 
instead was the direct result of a forward-looking State. Without this favorable technical 
decision, one may argue the State’s attempt to create an indigenous semiconductor fabrication 
industry would not have achieved the same level of success. While this decision was done by 
State institutions, and later followed by the private industry, without the structure of the policy 
making institutions being heavily influenced by the U.S- based Taiwanese engineers, such as Dr. 
Wen-Yuan Pan, RCA may not have transferred any CMOS technology and Taiwan’s technical 
edge may have diminished.  
 ITRI and ERSO’s agreement with RCA proved to be a watershed moment for Taiwan’s 
semiconductor industry. RCA agreed to train forty of Taiwan’s top young engineers, many of 
them graduates of U.S engineering higher education institutions, in wafer processes, design and 
chip manufacturing.  Following training, the engineers returned to ERSO and ITRI helping 55
advance the organizations semiconductor processes from 7 to 4.5 micron technology. With 
RCA’s technology and know-how transfer, ERSO successfully spun-off the public semiconductor 
development project into a private-public partnership to form the firm United Microelectronics 
(UMC).  These engineers continued to play a central role in Taiwan’s remarkable semiconductor 
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success. Many of them, including Tsai Ming-Kai now CEO of MediaTek, after working within 
the public consortia left to join State spinoff firms like UMC or TSMC, and then later founded or 
joined Taiwan’s rising private semiconductor firms in the late 80s and 90s.  
 Breznitz and Cho both suggest that State institutions like ERSO not only aided Taiwan’s 
technological upgrading by acting as a diffuser of foreign technology, but also served as a focal 
point for Taiwanese innovation. This was especially true for the successful State spinoffs of 
UMC and TSMC. Following ERSO’s initial technology acquisition and technical training with 
RCA, the public consortia successfully and independently upgraded their micron technology and 
aimed to commercialize this upgrade by forming a public-private company.  In addition to 56
receiving all its technical staff and technology directly from ERSO, UMC was also granted 
technical assistance from, and the use of, ERSO’s fabrication plant.  Without ERSO’s support, 57
UMC’s acquisition of technical talent (human capital) would have remained a challenge for the 
fledgling firm. The challenge was to then raise the initial capital requirement for 
commercializing ERSO’s fabrication technology. Without the capital provided by the ministry of 
economic affairs (MoEA), UMC’s capital sources would have been insufficient due to a reticent 
private capital sector.   58
 While the founding of UMC put Taiwan’s semiconductor firmly integrated within the 
global semiconductor industry, the introduction of TSMC and the pureplay-foundry model 
revolutionized the entire industry and resulted in Taiwan’s top firms carving out market massive 
niches at the high-tech manufacturing level of production. Following the success of UMC, in 
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1981 the Science and Technological Advisory Group and specifically President and Premier Sun, 
aggressively pushed the advancement of Taiwan’s VLSI capabilities to one micron level by 
1988.  After some back and forth between ERSO and UMC over where the fabrication facility 59
project should go, the State decided to designate ERSO as the entity charged with the project in 
order to avoid an over concentration of power in a single private firm.  At this point, Taiwan’s 60
public research consortia continued to lead the way for domestic industry by providing advanced  
research and development for designs processes and technologies. However, as semiconductor 
design capabilities increased it became more and more evident that the lack of fabrication 
manufacturing facilities forced Taiwanese semiconductor design firms to contract manufacturing 
to third party manufactures, who were also potential competitors at the design stage of 
production. For example, part of ERSO’s VLSI project was the development of DRAM chip 
designs, and ERSO pursued a joint-venture strategy with ethnic Chinese Silicon Valley design 
firm Vitelic. The project successfully designed a DRAM chip but then Vitelic sold the designs to 
the Korean firm Hyundai, a project partially funded by the State, which caused rising concerns 
that despite technological advancement Taiwanese firms would not fully capitalize on the 
Industry’s increasing capabilities to generate high-tech intellectual property.  In an effort to 61
provide advanced manufacturing facilities for Taiwan’s rising design firms, in 1985 ITRI 
recruited Morris Chang, then CEO of General Instruments, to serve as president of the 
institution. Significantly, “instead of proposing a conventional semiconductor company with its 
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own product portfolio, Chang advocated for pure-play ‘silicon foundry’ operating VLSI process 
technology to manufacture chips for small Taiwanese firms and international clients.”  62
 Raising the initial capital investment for the spin-off project, TSMC, was not an easy 
task. Premier Yu at the time stipulated that the project must not be entirely financed by the 
government in order to quicken the pace of private capital into Taiwan’s semiconductor 
industry.  However, even in the 1980s the cost of building an advanced manufacturing facility 63
and the unattractive risk-return tradeoffs made it improbable that private capital would back such 
a project.  Breaking with Taiwanese conservative views of foreign direct investment, ITRI again 64
pursued a MNC joint-venture partner and eventually found one in the Dutch MNC Phillips. The 
capital from Phillips gave them a 27.5% equity stake in TSMC, with another 48.3 % of the 
investment coming from an investment arm of the KMT party, the China Development 
Corporation.  The State provided initial R&D, finance and human capital as many of ITRI’s 65
engineers, including Morris Chang, left to join the new spinoff company TSMC. Significantly, 
TSMC and Phillips signed a cross-licensing agreement allowing TSMC the use of Phillips 2 and 
1.5 micron process technologies.  This agreement allowed TSMC to utilize Phillips advanced 66
designs in their fabrication technology without risking potential legal liability. Following the 
arrival of TSMC, Taiwan’s semiconductor industry rapidly expanded as private capital eventually 
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recognized the potential for returns from Taiwan’s new niche in the high-tech semiconductor 
global division of labor. 
 Many scholars argue the development of Taiwan’s industry had three distinct phases: 
seeding, start-up, and expansion.  Jou and Chen’s article “Keeping the High-tech region open 67
and dynamic: the organizational networks of Taiwan’s IC industry” focuses analysis on 
organizational events. These events are separated by the periods of Taiwan’s high-tech 
development, and defined as actions taken by high-tech organizations which influenced firm 
organizational structure and development decisions.  Additionally, events were divided into 68
categories of either technological, financial, or manufacturing. They suggest these events 
facilitated Taiwan’s development of a vertically disintegrated agglomeration system in the 
Hsinchu Science Park region.  Specifically, during the seeding or infancy stage of Taiwan’s 69
high-tech development, the organizational events found by Jou and Chen’s study were mostly 
organized by ITRI. Notedly, the location of these events were primarily in Taiwan and the United 
States, which indicates ITRI understands the importance of and facilitated domestic firms 
simultaneously developing organizational relationships within Taiwan’s highly disintegrated 
local producer network, as well as within global networks. Following the seeding stage of 
development, Taiwan’s private firms began to participate in organizational events in large 
numbers. However, without the State's early attempts to connect domestic and global firms, as 
well as the successful spin-offs of UMC and TSMC, these private firms would have lacked clear 
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examples for potential returns owing to these industry interactions, and as a result may have 
pursued a different expansion strategy.  
 Taiwan’s government is largely responsible for launching Taiwan’s semiconductor 
industry primarily due to ERSO and ITRI’s successful spin-off companies, TSMC and UMC, 
which are now the pureplay-foundry leaders within Taiwan and compete against other leading 
global firms like Intel, Samsung and Texas Instruments. State technocrats and groups like the 
TAC and STAG took the first steps towards supporting global and domestic information 
exchange by placing ethnic Chinese engineers with experience in the U.S. industry as key 
decision makers within public institutions. The State circumvented private capital’s reticence to 
invest in Taiwan’s fledgling high-tech semiconductor industry by providing public R&D 
spending, public capital as well as human capital support for creating the spin-off companies 
TSMC and UMC. Without these initial State-led efforts to establish the semiconductor industry, 
where technocrats led prescient decisions to pursue CMOS processing technology, as well as 
avoid over concentration of industry activity within a single national champion firm, then 
Taiwan’s semiconductor industry would likely not have achieved such a high level of success.   
Public Inputs Supporting Cross Cultural and Cross-Industry Communication 
 The State’s impact over Taiwan’s semiconductor development trajectory did not begin or 
end with the successful spinoffs of ERSO and ITRI. In fact, many State directives were not 
directly connected to public R&D spending, guiding industry or firm level technical 
development decisions, and State capital injections (human, financial) directly into the domestic 
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industry.  Additionally, as discussed briefly previously, State institutions, like ITRI and the HSIP, 
took an active role in establishing cross industry connections by opening offices in Silicon Valley 
and initiating the first ‘organizational events’ for Taiwan’s semiconductor industry. Taiwan’s 
government took a society wide approach by utilizing all the instruments at the State’s disposal 
including providing tax benefits, as well as educational and industry infrastructure to incentivize 
and attract ethnic Chinese engineers from overseas. Not all government support comes in the 
form of direct involvement with industry.  
 A signature development of Taiwan’s semiconductor industry was the creation of the 
Hsinchu Science Based Industrial Park (HSIP). Again, this policy came directly from State 
organizations, which in this case was the National Science Council (NSC). The HSIP is 
universally acknowledged as the center of Taiwan’s innovative and high-tech activity. The park 
continues to favor firms with significant R&D operations, as the HSIP often matched firm’s 
R&D levels, as well as gives special subsidies including tax holidays, exemption on equipment 
importation and commodity exports and low-interest loans.  Additionally, the park provides 70
specialized infrastructure including housing and education for foreign-based engineers and their 
families.  The State sponsored upgrading of the educational infrastructure in the park, such as 71
the creation the International Bilingual School at Hsinchu Science Park, is a clear example of 
State policy indirectly yet actively targeting these returnee entrepreneurs. The school is jointly 
overseen by the Ministry of Education and the National Science Council and offers courses 
taught in english, including American history, as well as offers Advanced Placement classes. 
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Significantly, according to the schools website, recently the school has also included 
requirements for mandarin and Chinese cultural classes, which perhaps indicates China as an 
important location for expanding Taiwan’s high-tech development. While the State created the 
park and provided the capital for the project, the idea for high-tech parks already existed, like 
Silicon Valley, albeit in a different form. The HSIP is a clear example of State policy attempting 
to mirror and catalyze a network-based model of development by creating attractive benefits for 
returnee entrepreneurs and their families. 
 Taiwan’s technocrats often attempted to connect industry with local technical schools like 
National Taiwan University and National Tsing-Hua University. During ERSO’s development of 
VLSI technology, the organization attempted to seed VLSI capabilities in Taiwan’s technical 
schools by providing projects to professors and their students.  The National Science Council 72
made significant financial commitments to semiconductor research with local universities, even 
despite some government opposition.  Additionally, the location of the HSIP as well as ITRI is 73
in close proximity to National Taiwan University and National Tsing-Hua University. 
Significantly, the fact that the HSIP was deliberately located adjacent to top technical universities 
mirrors other high-tech clusters, like Silicon Valley. The HSIP not only emulates a Silicon Valley 
style of high-tech clustering, the HSIP as well as other public organizations like ITRI established 
offices in Silicon Valley where “they quickly built local industry organizations in order to 
monitor industrial and technical trends for domestic producers.”  These organizations believed 74
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that upgrading technologically on the domestic front meant fostering industry relationships 
abroad, specifically within the United States technical communities.  
 Taiwan’s National Science Council has served an important and changing set roles in the 
development of Taiwan’s semiconductor industry, including leading initiatives like the 
foundation of the HSIP. Following the derecognition of Taiwan’s government by the United 
States, Japan and other Western government in the 1970s, “the NSC has remained in close touch 
with equivalent organizations in these countries, primarily through paradiplomatic channels.”  75
Significantly, while the NSC played an important role in “the upgrading of Taiwan’s industrial 
infrastructure,” the organization must compete for funding with other S&T development 
organization such as the Industrial Development Bureau of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the 
Council for Economic Planning and Development, the Ministry of Telecommunications and 
others all supporting various State sponsored R&D projects.  This unique decentralized 76
infrastructure encouraged State support of basic research projects, that act as the foundation for 
the commercialized R&D of Taiwan’s semiconductor industry, while also discouraging State 
consortia and institutions from over-prioritizing certain projects with closer connections to the 
State.  
 Taiwan’s government utilized a range of policy tools and public inputs in order to attract 
MNC’s as well as ethnic Chinese engineer returnees to Taiwan. While Taiwan offered generous 
tax benefits, capital injections, public R&D and favorable regulations, the State took also too a 
cumulative societal approach by emphasizing integrating industry with academia, providing 
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high-level educational opportunities for an international workforce, as well as creating the 
Hscinhu Science Park. In the next section, we will turn our focus to assess if these State policies 
significantly impacted both State spinoff, as well as private firms, development trajectories.   
State Inputs Impacting Firm-level Development Decisions in State Spinoff and Private Firms 
 While the onslaught of global economic forces, as well as the fragmentation and vertical 
disintegration of production has severely reduced State’s ability to direct development decisions,   
Taiwan’s government, like any other, maintains responsibility for setting the regulations and 
benchmarks for the development of institutional structures. The structure of a system informs 
and shapes actors decisions within a system; therefore, the State retains a large degree of impact 
over industry because all industries rely on public sector institutional inputs. An often discussed 
unique Taiwanese State policy is the structure of the financial system. A system which limits 
patient capital discourages the formation of massive long-term focused capital intensive firms, 
while also encourages the development of small and medium sized enterprises focused on short 
term profits. Unlike comparable East Asian economies, Taiwan lacks massive corporate 
conglomerates, like the Korean Chaebols or Japanese Keiretsu, which in a sense prevents 
investment in capital intensive markets like the DRAM memory market.  Even within Taiwan’s 77
semiconductor manufacturing sector, which requires increasingly large R&D and capital 
investment, in 1993 only 68% of revenue from Taiwan’s foundry market came from the top three 
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firms compared to 96% concentration in Korea.  While the industry developed the concentration 78
of revenue in Taiwan’s top firms increased, Taiwan still maintains many small to medium sized 
IC design and select foundry firms. While one can argue that this is at least part due to the 
structure of Taiwan’s financial system set up by Taiwan’s conservative bureaucrats, the historical 
context of Taiwan also plays a significant role in determining the scale of business 
organization.  79
 Taiwan’s medium to small sized semiconductor firms in part developed as a result of 
Taiwan’s unique financial system, which reduced the amount of patient capital in circulation. As 
noted in the previous section, one of the main reasons the State decided to pursue fabrication 
capabilities was the result of Taiwan’s smaller and medium sized firms having to give their 
designs to potential competitors in order to manufacture their product. With that said, without 
Taiwan’s domestic producer environment, a system with large numbers of small to medium sized 
firms, perhaps the State would not have easily recognized the potential benefits of developing 
modular VLSI fabrication capabilities. More specifically, ITRI may not have pursued Morris 
Chang and the pureplay-foundry vision he advocated for.  
  These smaller-scale firms, like Winbond Electronics Corporation, are unable to compete 
with TSMC or UMC’s successful economies of scale model of production. As a result, evidence 
supports the trend that companies are forced to specialize within small niches of the 
semiconductor industry’s division of labor. Additionally, smaller firms, like VIS, that fail to 
specialize— investing heavily in R&D activities—results in lower rates of technological 
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advancement, thereby disadvantaging the firm. When comparing TSMC and Winbond 
Electronics R&D to net income ratio from 2002 to 2005, one can clearly see that Winbond, a 
smaller as well as late-comer firm compared to TSMC, not only invests a higher percentage of 
their net income in R&D, but also invests at times up to 400% of their net income into R&D 
investments.  While Winbond still has a gap between firm level fabrication technological 80
capabilities and the cutting edge of Taiwan’s semiconductor pureplay-foundry sector TSMC, 
Winbond maintains a near identical rate of technological-advancement. Meanwhile, VIS has a 
lower percentage R&D to net income ratio than TSMC and achieved no significant technological 
advancement in fabrication technology during the same time. Owing to the structure of the 
State’s bureaucratic and financial system, which structurally limits the concentration of industry 
power and favoring natural rather than national champions,  results in Taiwan’s semiconductor 
industry containing both large and medium sized firms. This structural difference, largely 
influenced by State development decisions, results in medium sized and or late arriving firms 
investing a disproportionate amount of firm net income into R&D. High levels of investment in 
R&D is an indicator for a firm’s level of specialization. In other words, a unique characteristic of 
Taiwan’s semiconductor industry development is the tendency for smaller and medium sized 
firms to specialize and carve out smaller and smaller niches within the semiconductor supply 
chain division of labor.  
 Sigficantly, Winbond Electronics is a firm that was not technically a State spinoff firm, 
but does have semi-state origins. Winbond’s founder, Dr Ding Yuan Yang was the former head of 
ERSO’s pilot semiconductor manufacturing facility as well as an alumni of the RCA 40. He, like 
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many of Taiwan’s most successful engineers, started his career in the United States and was 
recruited back to Taiwan to serve as the head of ERSO’s fab. Dr Yang decided to leave ERSO on 
his own accord and found an investor in Walshin Lihaw Corporation, an original investor in 
UMC, and privatized ERSO’s lab while also hiring may of the ERSO staff working at the fab.  81
Winbond’s background with ERSO, where Winbond’s very same engineers helped successfully 
spin-off UMC and TSMC, perhaps gave the new private firm a competitive edge as they were 
quickly able to acquire high-level technical talent from State sources.  While true, the semi-state 82
origin of Winbond allowed the firm to pass over significant barriers to entry, other firms also 
successfully broke through barriers of entry without any State background, firms like Macronix 
International. Significantly, these private firms development decisions are still in part impacted 
by State inputs like the structure of the financial system. 
 Macronix (MXCI), founded in 1989, was one of the first semiconductor firms in Taiwan 
financed with venture capital.  Macronix raised sufficient funds to establish a VLSI fab in the 
HSIP with advanced micron processes as well as hire over 40 Chinese-Americans with 
experience in the US semiconductor industry.  Macronix is another example of how Taiwan’s 83
semiconductor industry pursued intense specialization, resulting in competitive advantages and 
market niches. Macronix, similar to TSMC, aggressively pursued strategic technology alliances 
and joint-development strategies with large MNC’s. Specifically, Macronix attempted to pursue 
DRAM memory chip fabrication technologies by partnering with leading Japanese and other 
MNC firms like, Matsushita Electric Industrial, not as a way to compete in the DRAM market, 
 Dong-Sung Cho and John Mathews, Tiger Technologies, 174. 81
 Ibid., 172. 82
 Ibid., 175-176.83
Farley !41
but in order to build technological expertise and eventually offer specialized DRAM chip 
services.  It’s a testament to the success of UMC and TSMC assuaging investors concerns that a 84
firm with private capital origins was willing to enter such a capital-intensive and high-risk 
market like DRAM production. These partnerships, as well as high R&D to net income ratios 
50% in 1999, 48% in 2004, 42% in 2006—- were significantly higher than TSMC during these 
same years—ultimately resulted in the firm maintaining relevance despite it’s relatively small 
size compared to market leaders TSMC and Intel.  Regardless of firms origins, in order to 85
remain competitive and carve out market niches, Taiwan’s smaller to medium sized 
semiconductor fabrication firms generally maintain extremely high levels of R&D to net income 
ratios.  
 Notably, TSMC generally has significant lower levels of R&D to net income ratios 
compared to leading edge competitors Intel, Texas Instruments and Samsung. For example, in 
2003 TSMC R&D to net income ratios was 33.465% while the combined average of Intel, Texas 
Instruments and Samsung was 92%; in 2005 TSMC R&D to net income ratio was 14.3% while 
the combined average of Intel, Texas Instruments and Samsung was 63.8%.  The data suggests 86
in order to remain competitive at the cutting edge, even large firms with successful economies of 
scale invest heavily in R&D. Significantly, the large gap between TSMC and it’s competitors 
may be a result of the data not differentiating between types of R&D within the Intel, Texas 
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Instruments and Samsung’s multiple different markets. Unfortunately, the data provided does not 
categorize these firms R&D into market sectors, like the pureplay-foundry.  
 The firms Winbond, Macronix, and TSMC are respectively semi-state, private, and state 
origin firms that all exhibit high levels of specialization. Notably, the smaller to medium sized 
firms, Winbond and Macronix, consistently demonstrate higher levels of R&D to net income 
ratios compared to industry leader TSMC. The data ultimately suggests that late-comer firms in 
high-tech late-developing economies must maintain disproportionately high levels of R&D in 
order to specialize and find new niches within the division of labor. While this may partially be a 
result of State inputs and polices creating a financial system favoring the development of smaller 
to medium sized firms, as well as State R&D incentives and requirements within the HSIP which 
often matched R&D levels of the firms within the HSIP and required high levels of R&D in the 
first place, there may be other factors within the industry that encouraged increasing levels of 
specialization and continuous splits in the division of labor.   
 In this chapter we found that firm level decisions are impacted by a multitude of factors, 
and State inputs and infrastructure certainly impacts these decisions. When private capital was 
unwilling to make risky initial investments and R&D, public consortia like the ERSO and ITRI 
forged the path forward for Taiwan’s domestic semiconductor industry. State policy aimed to 
attract and retain the technical talent of U.S.-based ethnic Chinese engineers by including them 
in advisory groups charged with setting the domestic industry’s goals and standards. Favorable 
tax incentives and public infrastructure like the HSIP, which offered schools for international 
students, are examples of State policy not only aiming to attain the human capital of these 
returnees, but also the connections and resources of multinational corporations. While we’ve 
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seen how the State incorporated these returnees into State infrastructure, further analysis on the  
backgrounds and experiences of the leading engineers, founder, and CEOs is necessary to 
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Chapter 3:  
Ethnic Returnee Networks and the Development of Taiwan’s Semiconductor Industry 
 Quantifying the impact of individual returnee entrepreneurs is a difficult task as many of 
their influences took an institutional form through the advisory committees and public consortia 
they engaged and worked with. In order to truly understand the depth of their contributions, the 
following discussion will first analyze the educational and professional backgrounds of key 
policy advisors and engineers involved with Taiwan’s semiconductor industry during the seeding 
stage to understand how their experiences helped shape key initial decisions, link Taiwan’s 
semiconductor industry with the global industry, and facilitate early technological advancements.  
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This chapter will explore and analyze the incentives and motivations behind the return of ethnic 
Chinese talent including State tax policies and other public inputs, as well as other cultural, 
historical and personal motivations significant to the return of Chinese diaspora. In the final 
section we will turn our focus on the expansion and spreading out phase of Taiwan’s 
semiconductor industry and explore how returnee entrepreneurs continued to lead Taiwan’s 
semiconductor industry to achieve cutting edge technological upgrades and product 
specialization. Our discussion will first turn to a literary anecdote in order to provide the reader a 
complex understanding for reasons behind both the dispersal and return of the professional 
Chinese diaspora.  
Abroad and Home Again:  A Literary Introduction to Taiwan’s Returnee Talent 
  The life of Saxenian's returnee entrepreneurs, specifically in the United States, is often 
reflected in Taiwan’s literary culture. For example, “Winter Nights” by Bai Xianyong, a writer 
born in Guilin China at the cusp of the Second Sino-Japanese war who left mainland China for 
Taiwan at a young age, is relevant in our discussion of Taiwanese returnee entrepreneurs and 
engineers as the story is primarily a dialogue between two former classmates at Beijing 
University, U.C Berkeley professor Wu Zhugao, and Taiwan University professor Yu Qinlei. 
Through their personal narratives we can attain a deeper understanding of the historical and 
cultural motivations for ethnic Chinese returnees returning home, as well as leaving home, which 
ultimately creates bidirectional movement of Taiwanese talent between the United States and 
Taiwan.  
Farley !46
 The story begins with a vivid description of Yu Qinlei’s home in Taiwan, serving as a 
metaphor for his life and current condition. “The house that Professor Yu made his shelter looked 
exactly the same as the other University quarters in the alley, old buildings that had survived the 
Japanese occupation. It bore all the scars of long neglect…moldering with decay and 
disrepair.”  Later we discover that Qinlei is actually in “disrepair” as he had an accident during 87
the May Fourth protests at Beijing University, while he and Wu Zhugao were classmates, which 
was further damaged by poor medical treatment at Taiwan University Hospital.  The narrative 88
highlights the backwardness of Taiwan's society, specifically focusing on a lack of technological 
progress. Yu Qinlei views his old classmate’s successful tenured life abroad at an American 
university with admiration and a sense of longing to have had lead a similar life abroad.  He 89
also had paid for his two children to study engineering abroad at great personal financial 
expense. His youngest son when meeting Wu Zhu Gao took the opportunity to ask the American 
professor “‘Is it true that the Physics Department (At U.C. Berkeley) often spends more than half 
a million dollars on one single experiment?’ Jungian’s youthful face gleamed with envy.”  Yu 90
Qinlei’s see’s both his future and his children’s future abroad, expressing awe and hopefulness at 
the opportunity for U.S-based experience, especially in high-level scientific research. These 
sentiments underpinned the brain drain in Taiwan, but what Yu Qinlei does not understand is the 
strong feelings of those abroad like Wu Zhugao with a deep sense of yearning to return home.    
 Bai Xianyong, “Winter Nights,” in The Columbia Anthology of Modern Chinese Literature, (New York: Columbia 87
University Press, 2007), 210. 
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 Upon Professor Wu Zhugao’s long-awaited return to Taiwan, the Central Daily News 
noted that his arrival and lectures attracted the likes of more than one hundred Taiwanese 
scholars and dignitaries.  The professor is happy to give his lectures to Taiwan’s academic and 91
technocratic audiences. In fact, the next morning after his visit with Qinlei, Professor Wu 
planned to visit Taiwan Political University for a lecture.  Despite his excitement to contribute 92
to Taiwan, and connect academica with Taiwan's technocratic class, Wu Zhugao carries a deep 
guilt and shame for abandoning his home and living life abroad. He specifically refers to himself 
as feeling like “one of Emperor Xuan Zong’s white haired ladies, who just kept telling foreigners 
anecdotes of the Tianbao reign.”  During the Tang dynasty Emperor Xuan Zong's court ladies 93
are depicted in Tang funerary sculpture to represent both grace and beauty, which mirrors Wu 
Zhugao’s extension contributions to his field.  However, like the older court ladies who often 94
left home to join the court, he feels separated from his home and his only purpose to entertain the 
foreigners around him. Wu Zhugao feels alone while abroad, especially after his wife has passed, 
and plans to return to Taiwan and engage Taiwan's academic community.    95
 Bai Xianyong’s story is not condemning ethnic Chinese who left for intellectual and other 
pursuits abroad, but instead a celebration for individuals who returned to act as conduits between 
their native country and highly developed countries like the United States. The story also 
highlights motivations behind a bi-gration, both Taiwanese professionals leaving to pursue 
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further education and returning to find community and home, that focus more on cultural and 
historical sentiments rather than only monetary. The author’s decision to have Qinlei’s son study 
engineering was a prescient choice, especially knowing the rapid increase of engineering 
students as well as technological development in Taiwan that ensued during the following 
decades.  Although the share of Taiwanese abroad students in the United States has declined 
since the mid 1990, the U.S continues to be the most attractive place for Taiwanese students 
studying abroad. Students like the Taiwanese professor's son, and the advice of academics or 
career professionals abroad, like Professor Wu Zhugao, would later aid in Taiwan’s technological 
leap-frogging.  
Key Returnees in Taiwan’s Semiconductor Seeding Stage of Development  
 Many returnee entrepreneurs and engineers joined advisory committees and public 
consortia early in the development of Taiwan’s semiconductor industry. The following discussion 
will analyze the educational and professional backgrounds of key policy advisors and engineers 
involved with Taiwan’s industry during the seeding stage of the semiconductor industry to 
attempt to quantify how their experiences shaped key initial development decisions, link 
Taiwan’s semiconductor industry with the global industry, and facilitate early technological 
advancements.   
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 Breznitz argues that the influence of the returnee entrepreneurs only started after the 
returnees saw an economic opportunity in Taiwan, and not vice-versa.  Breznitz’ view undercuts 96
and fails to understand the importance of foreign based ethnic Chinese advisors, primarily from 
the United States, who helped guide Taiwan’s semiconductor industry development when the 
industry was still in its infancy. Specifically the Technical Advisory Board (TAC) as well as the 
Science and Technology Advisory Group (STAG) had significant foreign based membership.  In 97
1974, Dr. Wen Yuan Pan, an RCA engineer, following an invitation from the Minister of 
Economic Affairs Dr. Y.S. Sun, established and led The TAC. The TAC, consisting of and led by 
Dr. Pan and Chinese engineers working for leading US electronics firms like IBM and Bell Labs, 
prepared a report to the Taiwan Cabinet on how to seed a semiconductor industry in Taiwan. The 
report recommended the following initiatives; Taiwan execute technology transfer agreements by 
inviting U.S firms to bid for a contact and specifically targeting CMOS technology, as well as 
offering technical training for engineers in the United States, and this activity was to be centered 
in a State agency.  98
 Dr. Wen Yuan Pan is known by many as the father of Tawian’s Semiconductor industry 
and in an interview with ‘medium.com’ Anna Lee Saxenian notes “Pan’s involvement certainly is 
a striking addition to our knowledge of the early ties linking Silicon Valley and regions in Asia.” 
Born in China, Pan received his undergraduate education at Shanghai Jiaotong University and 
pursued a post-graduate degree in electrical engineering at Stanford University. Pan had a 
difficult journey as one of China’s first leading electrical engineers. In fact, his Stanford 
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education almost prematurely ended with the Japanese invasion of China in the 1930s, however 
he chose to stay in the United States to continue his education with hopes to return home and 
improve China’s technological level. Pan worked at RCA for over thirty years where he was 
credited for securing over 30 patents.  While the communist victory prevented Pan’s return to 99
mainland China, he found many former colleagues from his time at Jiaotong University working 
in Taiwan, which— along with the fact his wife’s family had strong ties to upper echelons of 
Taiwan’s government—ultimately led him to pursue his dream of upgrading his home country in 
Taiwan. 
 Even prior to his involvement with the Technical Advisory Board, Pan had been working 
with his counterparts in Taiwan by regularly organizing meetings of overseas Chinese engineers. 
These efforts would become known as the ‘Modern Engineering and Technology Seminars,’ 
which Taiwan’s returnee entrepreneurs early involvement in building connections between 
overseas Chinese engineers and Taiwanese technocrats. Significantly, the Chinese Institute of 
Engineers, established in 1917, helped coordinate these meetings and specifically focused on 
bringing together leading engineers with Taiwanese technocrats.  According to the CIE-USA 100
website, the organization and it’s Taiwanese counterparts will continue to provide technical and 
science seminars, as well as career development seminars and leadership seminars for continuous 
promotion of technological advancement and exchange in the United States and abroad. Dr. 
Pan’s individual role in developing Taiwan’s semiconductor is exhibited by a letter he sent to Dr. 
E. E. Terman, a Stanford professor known as the father of Silicon Valley and a mentor to Dr. Pan.  
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 I proposed a 3-phase project to develop the LSI MOS technology in Taiwan for a total  
 Government funding of the order of ten million dollars as follows. Phase 1: 1975-1978  
 Technology transfer from several U.S. universities and a U.S. industrial company. Phase  
 II: 1978-1980 Pilot production of standard circuits and several custom circuits to supply  
 the local needs. Phase III: 1980-1985 Will gradually transfer the technology and   
 facilities to the local industry. To my delight, the project was quickly approved, as  
 proposed, and I now find myself deeply involved in helping the Industrial Technology  
 Research Institute (ITRI) for implementation. We have already reached amiable   
 agreements with the University of Florida in Gainesville and the Case-Western Reserve  
 University in Cleveland for technical personal trainings.   101
Dr. Pan’s letter suggests his ideas had an extremely high-level of influence over the development 
trajectory of Taiwan’s semiconductor industry. Dr. Pan’s experience at RCA largely facilitated 
RCA’s decision to share their out-dated CMOS logic processing technology with ERSO/ITRI.  102
Dr. Pan contributed greatly to Taiwan’s semiconductor development prior to the industry 
becoming highly profitable— suggesting that although economic incentives are significant in 
attracting top-talent, shared history and cultural identity also represent significant motivators for 
the return of ethnic Chinese high-tech talent. Dr. Pan, however, may have included in his 
proposal for the intention of the State to gradually transfer the technology and facilities to the 
local industry as a means to signal to other returnee’s that although high-tech developed will start 
in the State, the benefits of Taiwan’s technological upgrading will eventually reach the private 
market and those poised to lead it.  
 Other foreign members of the TAC would later return to Taiwan to serve different roles 
both within State institutions like ERSO/ITRI, as well as within the Taiwan’s private 
semiconductor industry as it developed in the late 80s and early 90s. Dr. Genda Hu, left Silicon 
Valley to serve as general director of ERSO/ITRI and now is the vice president of TSMC. Hu 
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suggests “the U.S. experience had a tremendous impact on my generation. We were exposed to 
world-class researchers and leading-edge technical opportunities. We observed firsthand the 
growth of the electronics and computer industries, and how business models and mentalities 
were changing.”  These foreign returnees in advisory boards like the TAC lead and empowered 103
others success by taking their know-how and contributing both in providing technical expertise 
and managerial experience as well as knowledge of industry practices and trends. These 
contributions guided the seeding of Taiwan’s semiconductor industry. The foreign returnee 
contributions within the State at ITRI and ERSO helped to upgrade Taiwan’s technological 
capabilities and provide leverage when engaging with the global market. Many of these advisory 
board returnees later served as leaders within the industry’s private firms.  
 Saxenian argues that organizations like ERSO and ITRI have “limited control over the 
pace and direction of innovation in domestic industry. However, the public sector has played a 
crucial role in the governance of the industrial system.”  She supplements her argument by 104
pointing to key industrial policy decisions like avoiding the creation of publicly funded ‘national 
champion’ firms, as well as other important inputs like investments in higher education and 
research and training. While Saxenian accurately highlights the role of the State in creating a 
supportive ecosystem for the development of specialized producers, in some sense, her claim 
under appreciates the efforts of Taiwan’s returnee engineers working within ITRI and ERSO 
during the seeding stage of industry. During this stage, ITRI upgraded the technological capacity, 
later dispersed to all of Taiwan, and also spun-off the two most successful pureplay-foundry 
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companies in Taiwan (UMC and TSMC). Leading this charge were returnee engineers like Ding-
Yuan Yang.  
 Ding Yuan-Yang was born in Nanjing, China, where both his parents were chemical 
engineers. He attended National Taiwan University, where he majored in electrical engineering. 
Ding Yuan Yang, like many other talented students, sought education abroad at U.S. universities. 
He attended Princeton University and received his Ph.D in Electrical Engineering in 1975. 
According to ‘ithistory.org,’ he worked for a brief period in the United States at Harris 
Semiconductor Company as a principal engineer. According to ‘computerhistory.org,’ Dr. Ding-
Yuan Yang was a founding member of ERSO, and led the RCA-37 in their technical training 
overseas following the ERSO’s initial technology transfer agreement. Significantly, the State 
actually provided for Yang’s Business Administration degree at Stanford, which came in useful 
for Yang and the industry later when he spun-off ERSO’s then outdated fabrication facility into a 
new company called Winbond in 1987. Without the leadership and expertise provided by 
returnees like Ding-Yuan Yang, the ERSO may not have had the technical expertise necessary for 
upgrading their outdated CMOS logic processing technology. Yang’s experience with the State 
highlights a reciprocative positive relationship that characterized interactions between returnee 
engineers and the State.  
 Taiwan’s public consortia, like the ERSO and ITRI, guided Taiwan’s early semiconductor 
industry in terms of the setting the trajectory for semiconductor development, as well as 
advancing technological innovation in Taiwan. Significantly, during the seeding stage of 
Taiwan’s semiconductor industry the State relied upon the networks and advice of key returnee 
engineers like Ding Yuan Yang and Dr. Pan who advised the State in organizations like the TAC 
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and STAG, as well as offered their technical and managerial know-how within ERSO and ITRI. 
These returnee engineers entered Taiwan’s nascent industry prior to any sign of profitability, but 
they also helped structure the system to eventually reward the early leaders of Taiwan’s private 
semiconductor industry. Our discussion will now turn to the contributions of Taiwan’s returnee 
entrepreneurs in Taiwan’s semiconductor industry following the initial seeding stage of 
development.  
Semiconductor Start-ups and Returnee Networks: Engineers, CEOs and Capitalists 
 Taiwan’s desire to attract top-talent is not a unique strategy for late-developing States 
pursuing high-tech industries. In fact, attracting top-talent is a global agenda that fosters 
competition between many developing high-tech economies. Recruiting high-level technical 
talent, or human capital, is a necessary first step to upgrading domestic tech industry and while 
some returnees, like Dr. Pan and Dr. Yang, were attracted to Taiwan prior to the industry 
becoming profitable, States cannot rely alone on shared ethnic ties and cultural identities. In the 
following section, we will discuss how Taiwan aggressively pursued a high-technical class of 
engineers by first demonstrating the potential of domestic industry with successful spinoffs UMC 
and TSMC, but perhaps even more important, the State began offering generous financial 
incentives for firms qualifying for the Taiwan Stock Exchange  Additionally, we will discuss 105
how the success of UMC and TSMC largely eliminated the risk-averse attitudes of domestic 
venture capitalists, and facilitated the significant entry of private capital investment into Taiwan’s 
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semiconductor industry. The contributions of these engineers, CEOs, and capitalists helped 
Taiwan’s new semiconductor industry develop strategies that undoubtedly increased the level of 
innovative activity, as well as avoid strategies that proved fallible in the returnees past 
experiences working in leading U.S. semiconductor firms. Ultimately, we will discuss the 
contributions of key returnees within the firms TSMC, Macronix, and Winbond by looking at 
how their backgrounds and expertise shaped their firm’s development trajectory and relative 
success.   
 Taiwan’s leading semiconductor fabrication firm, TSMC, is a globally competitive 
advanced semiconductor manufacture well connected to both the State and Taiwan’s returnee 
entrepreneurs. Prior to the arrival of Morris Chang, Taiwan’s bureaucrats recognized the need for 
creating advanced fabrication manufacturing facilities to prevent the outsourcing of designs and 
intellectual property, seen prominently by Vitelic’s sale of the partially publicly funded VLSI 
project to Hyundai. As Clare Brown and Greg Linden note in their book Chips and Change 
“relying on vertically integrated firms for fabrication raised intellectual property concerns 
because of the information revealed when the design was passed to the fab, and the possibility 
the fab owner might decide to enter the fabless company’s market.”  Under Morris Chang’s 106
leadership ITRI recognized these problems, but also recognized the potential of developing a 
firm that complemented the existing industry ecosystem by focusing solely on the fabrication of 
chips rather than the prevalent model of large integrated device manufacturers (IDMs).    107
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 Morris Chang, although now retired, was not the lone returnee in TSMC. In fact, sixteen 
of nineteen senior executives came to TSMC with American graduate degrees and work 
experience; additionally, although Robert Tsao CEO of UMC was not a returnee himself, in 
1997, five of the top nine senior executives in the company held American graduate degrees.  108
Chang himself claims that the returnees "most important contribution is their experience in 
managing world-class companies like HP, Intel, and Bell Labs. They bring the disciplined 
management style of these businesses.”  While in the past, Taiwanese businesses were 109
primarily run as family businesses, bringing in the returnees with management experience in 
prominent U.S firms perhaps signaled to U.S firms that TSMC and others were mirroring the 
business standards and practices of the existing semiconductor industry. As a result, leading edge 
semiconductor firms were more likely to work and collaborate with the Taiwanese domestic 
semiconductor industry.  
 Technical advances also facilitated this vertical disintegration shift in the organization of 
production including the solidification of MOS fabrication technology as the mainstream, which 
“provided a predictable technology trajectory for designers to follow,” as well as improvement in 
design transfer technology that allowed for fabless firms to seamlessly transfer their chip designs 
to Fabs specifically utilizing the Berkeley Transistor Simulator Model (BSIM).  Technical 110
changes helped facilitate the transition to fab/fabless production models, but it was also Morris 
Chang’s understanding of global business trends which led ITRI to pursue a pureplay foundry 
firm. Clare Brown and Greg Linden also note that challenges within the semiconductor industry 
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are often linked together, suggesting the importance of maintaining industry-wide connections 
and practices to better understand future development trajectories. For example, Fabrication 
firms, or pureplay-foundries, should pay close attentions to advances in lithography technology 
as “one of the central drivers of fab cost is lithography equipment, which typically accounts for 
20 percent of the fixed cost of an advanced fabrication facility.”  111
 While the innovative activity of the ERSO and ITRI significantly decreased following the 
initial spinoffs of UMC and TSMC, the legacy of these State institutions continued to support the 
developing private industry. “The ITRI has about a 15 per cent turn over rate annually, which 
implies that each year about 800 of ITRI/ERSO’s staff leave to join private firms or to start their 
own businesses.”  In fact, by 2000, specifically in the HSIP, a total of 4,108 returnees from 112
overseas worked in the Science Park as well 4,464 ITRI alumni.  While ITRI no longer 113
maintained its central role in terms of technology acquisition and technological development, the 
ITRI personal, many of whom were U.S.- based returnee engineers, were now armed with global 
industry connections from their time working abroad, State connections from their time working 
within State institutions, as well as local connections between their co-workers as many went on 
to found domestic firms. As a result, returnees were disproportionately likely to become 
entrepreneurs. Out of the 289 companies located in the HSIP in 2000, 42% of these companies 
founding teams were at least partially made up with returnee engineers.   For example, the firm 114
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Macronix was founded by returnee engineer and CEO Miin Wu, who also recruited over 40 U.S-
based ethnic Chinese engineers for the launching of his successful company.   115
 Following the founding of TSMC and the falling back of ERSO and ITRI’s role in 
guiding the semiconductor industry, the number of Taiwan’s IT industry ‘organizational events’ 
dramatically increased. From 1976 to 1985 Jou Sue-Ching and Chen Dung-Shen’s study found 
that there were 11 total events facilitating organizational connections among Taiwan’s local 
producers as well as among Taiwan’s domestic IT industry and primarily U.S- based firms. In the 
following 10 years, 1985-1995, the same study found there were 348 ‘organizational events’ 
creating domestic and global IT industry networks.   While the data collected was based on all 116
IT industry activity in Taiwan, we contend that the magnitude of difference between Taiwan's 
semiconductor industry and Taiwan's IT industry is minimal. Additionally, from 1985 to 1995, 
the number of returning  entrepreneurs in Taiwan skyrocketed.  Ultimately, the data suggests 117
that while the State’s public consortia played an important initial role in developing industry 
connections both within and outside of Taiwan, when the rate of ethnic Chinese U.S- based 
engineers entering Taiwan's semiconductor dramatically increased, so did cross-regional 
Taiwanese semiconductor industry connections.   
 Macronix, founded in 1988, is an excellent case study for examining the impact of 
returnee engineers, CEOs and venture capitalists as the firm was one of Taiwan’s first 
semiconductor firms completely funded by venture capital and the first semiconductor firm to be 
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listed on the Taiwanese Stock Exchange. Founder and CEO Miin Wu received his Master’s 
degree in Material Science and Engineering from Stanford University. According to Macronix’s 
corporate website, prior to establishing Macronix, he held senior and managerial positions with 
VLSI Technology Inc, Intel Corp, Rockwell International and Silixonix Inc. in Silicon Valley. As 
the first semiconductor firm listed on Taiwan’s Stock Exchange, Macronix benefited immensely 
from the attractive regulations surrounding employee-stock options. Taiwan’s taxes on employee 
stocks were on the basis of its price when issued rather than the current market value; Taiwan 
eliminated its capital gains taxes in 1990, therefore no taxes were collected when shares were 
sold and returnee engineers who brought capital gains from other jurisdictions were not taxed on 
those gains either.  As a result of these favorable conditions, by the mid 1990s, Taiwan’s 118
salaries for senior managers were three of four times higher than their equivalent U.S. peers.  119
The State’s tax structure gave tax breaks specifically aimed to facilitate companies offering very 
attractive employment offers to top foreign engineers.  Under Wu’s leadership Macronix became 
a leading world-class producer of flash-memory chips.  Significantly, this development was 120
facilitated by Macronix’s partnership with the US- based MNC VLSI Technology Inc, which Wu 
had worked for and developed personal and professional relationships.     121
 While Macronix was one of Taiwan’s first non State or even semi-State firms, the 
structure of Taiwan’s system did not attempt to stop the development of competitors to the State 
firms. Macronix’s technical and managerial guidance from the predominantly U.S- based ethnic 
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Chinese engineer workforce and leadership helped to achieve the firms’ aims to serve a customer 
base primarily in the United States, Japan and Europe by quickly recommending the 
development of a “targeted a range of niche products needed by next-generation PC’s and 
communication products.”   The choice to focus on a highly specialized niche can be credited 122
partially to the foreign returnees understanding of industry trends and practices.  Additionally, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, State incentives greatly encouraged intensive R&D 
investments, especially within the HSIP where Macronix located their first VLSI facility. Owing 
to the high level of specialization, TSMC and UMC must not have viewed Macronix as a threat 
to their business. In fact, TSMC helped the young company remain profitable and efficient by 
buying unused fab space and capital equipment that was largely unrelated to Macronix’s 
specialized products and also helpful for TSMC’s goal to achieve massive economies of scale.   123
Hence Taiwan's semiconductor industry developed so that new firms often specialized and 
complemented the activities of other Taiwanese semiconductor industry firms. These local 
industry connections proved to be extremely valuable tools for maintaining relevance and 
cohesion within the industry.  
 Perhaps the most significant contribution of these returnee entrepreneurs was their ability 
to recognize and understand the dynamics of industry trends and then push the State or private 
companies to create a development plan that is forward looking and maximizes returns.  As 
discussed previously, Dr. Ding Yuan Yang’s work at ERSO greatly impacted the success of 
Taiwan's seeding stage of semiconductor development. Dr. Yang's contributions to Taiwan's 
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semiconductor development continued through his founding of Winbond Electronics and the 
strategical guidance he provided. Dr. Yang's knowledge of the global semiconductor industry, 
specifically the trend of vertical disintegration and outsourcing of production, poised his firm 
Winbond for success.  
 Dr. Yang in 2004 wrote an article for a semiconductor manufacturing technology 
workshop.  The article highlights his in-depth understanding of global business trends and the 
opportunities these trends gave to those who recognized them. Dr. Yang understands that 
outsourcing in the semiconductor industry is triggered by “the threshold in developing highly 
complex SoC products and the solutions escalates quickly…very few companies are self-
sufficient in IP and in doing SoC from scratch and within own company…many companies like 
to focus on their own competence.”  Dr. Yang knew that many global IC design firms were 124
looking for a reliable partner to outsource the fabrication of their chips. He also knew in order to 
become a reliable partner and solve complex problems, his firms technological level must 
continuously advance. As a result, Winbond moved quickly to upgrade existing fab capabilities 
and built a second fab in 1992 which “incorporated the most advanced submicron technology, 
taking Winbond to a prime position in the Taiwan industry.”  Winbond moved ahead with 125
ambitious fab expansion plans even despite operating for a time at a negative cash-flow.  Both 126
Winbond's high-levels of R&D to net income ratios, as well as continuous fab expansion and 
technological upgrading aimed to create a fabrication firm that allowed fabless firms, primarily 
 Ding-Yuan Yang, "The outsourcing of SoC product development: Taiwan as the global center for SoC 124
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from the United States, to focus on their own objectives and hand off the product with 
confidence in the manufacture's technological competencies. Winbond's willingness and ability 
to spend large amounts of capital quickly, as well as Winbond's ranks of engineers with foreign 
experience in the global IT industry assured foreign producers Winbond would continue to 
upgrade fab technologies at the same level as the global cutting edge. Additionally, Winbond's 
expansion of fab capabilities assured IC design suppliers that their product would have a quick 
time to market, as well as provided evidence for incumbent firms like Toshiba that a tech-
development deal with Winbond could foster innovation in both for both Toshiba and Winbond. 
As a result, Winbond developed both in-house capabilities for technology innovation, as well as 
tapped into the innovative and advanced resources of the existing incumbent semiconductor 
firms.        127
 TSMC, Macronix, and Winbond are all successful semiconductor manufacture’s with 
technological capabilities close to or at the global cutting edge. Significantly, both TSMC and 
Winbond benefited directly from the ERSO and ITRI semiconductor projects. The tech transfers 
from the State allowed these firms to enter the market with already sophisticated technologies, 
which provided Taiwan's firms the leverage needed to form cross-licensing agreements, 
technology development partnerships and tech transfers from foreign MNC’s like Phillips, 
Toshiba, and Intel. As Saxenian argues “unlike Japan in the 1980s, Taiwan followed imitation 
with differentiation, not with direct competition.”  Taiwan’s semiconductor industry never 128
aimed to supplant the existing high-tech infrastructure in the United States, specifically in Silicon 
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Valley. In fact, firms like Winbond often collaborated with Taiwanese engineers like Fred Cheng, 
who “had worked in Silicon Valley for twenty years but knew Taiwan's technology community 
as well because he traveled to headquarters at least ten times a year.”  Taiwan’s silicon valley 129
engineers traveled home far more consistently than their Indian and mainland Chinese 
counterparts; “only 36 percent of the Taiwanese hadn’t visited Taiwan in the past three years,” 
significantly lower than mainland Chinese 56 percent and 48 percent of Indian engineers.”   130
Conclusion 
 Taiwan's returnee entrepreneurs contributed to the development of Taiwan’s 
semiconductor industry in a multifaceted manner. During the seeding of Taiwan’s industry, 
returnee engineers like Dr. Wen Yuan Pan, Dr. Ding Yuan Yang and others helped shape the 
direction of development from within State institutions like the ERSO, ITRI, TAC, and STAG. 
These organizations maintained a large foreign membership with experience in large incumbent 
technology firms, like Texas Instruments, Intel and Bell Labs. The returnees informed and 
advised the decisions of these organizations, which as discussed in Chapter 2, Taiwan’s 
semiconductor industry would not have succeeded without. The technical experience, personal 
and private networks as well as managerial experience of Taiwan’s returnee population continued 
to lead both the large State-origin firms like UMC and TSMC as well as Taiwan’s private 
semiconductor firms like Winbond and Macronix. Winbond’s and Macronix's high levels of 
 Anna Lee Saxenian, The New Argonauts, 163.  129
 Shenglin Chang, The Global Silicon Valley Home: Lives and Landscapes within Taiwanese American Trans-130
Pacific Culture (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 41.
Farley !64
specialization are both a reflection of State policies that encouraged and subsidized R&D 
funding, as well as a reflection of returnee entrepreneurs’ knowledge of global business trends, 
like outsourcing and the disintegration of vertical production, which rewarded Taiwan’s firms 
with high technological levels and specialized products.  
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Chapter 4: 
Findings from Taiwan’s Semiconductor Industry and Potential Future Implications 
 Taiwan’s semiconductor industry, specifically the pureplay-foundry, has achieved a high 
level of success both in terms of global market share and technological capabilities. There are 
multiple actors in Taiwan that deserve credit for the industry’s remarkable success. The State, 
primarily through public research consortia, advisory groups, and favorable tax and financial 
incentives, helped to guide the industry in infancy, as well as facilitate the attraction of top 
technical talent to Taiwan. Ethnic Chinese returnee entrepreneurs and their personal and 
professional networks helped form the recommendations of groups like the TAC and STAG, 
which ultimately informed and shaped the decisions of Taiwan’s technocrats during the seeding 
stage of Taiwan’s semiconductor development. Additionally, the returnee engineers and 
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entrepreneurs continued to aid the development of Taiwan’s industry as more and more small to 
medium sized private firms emerged in the 1990s and early 2000s. Without the State’s tailoring 
of policy to attract returnee entrepreneurs, and without the returnee’s technical talent, managerial 
know-how and work experience it is unlikely Taiwan would have achieved the current level of 
semiconductor success.  
 The structure of Taiwan’s financial system, which reduced patient capital and had 
historically encouraged the development of small to medium sized businesses, as well as early 
State decisions—like choosing not to develop the project which would eventually become TSMC 
within UMC—resulted in less concentration of industry power and revenue within Taiwan’s top 
firms. The industry benefited and increased innovation owing to the competitive nature of having 
many firms, both large and small, with high-technological capabilities. Each firm had to find a 
specialized niche within different semiconductor fabrication types and conduct high levels of 
R&D. Oftentimes larger firms like TSMC would facilitate smaller to medium sized firms 
specialization as TSMC would buy unused fab space and technology no longer relevant to the 
smaller firm, but helpful for a large firm like TSMC for maintaining economies to scale.  
 The State utilized a wide range of public instruments to attract the technical talent of 
Taiwanese-American U.S based engineers and entrepreneurs. The National Science Council’s 
Hsinchu Science Based Park provided both the industry infrastructure for physical production, 
provided educational infrastructure for the english-speaking children of returnee engineers, and 
located the high-tech industry in close proximity to Taiwan’s top engineering universities. The 
park facilitated the development of both cross-regional as well as domestic networks of 
producers. The HSIP as well as early State efforts initiating cross-regional collaboration, such as 
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the METS seminars, aided the development of Taiwan’s semiconductor industry.  Additionally, 
the State’s inclusion of local technical and engineering schools in product R&D allowed different 
levels of Taiwanese society to work together to achieve a common goal, technological expansion. 
  While the State may have been the locus of technological innovation during the seeding 
stage of Taiwan’s semiconductor industry, key returnees like Dr. Wen Yuan Pan and Dr. Ding 
Yuan Yang helped create the State’s infrastructure, and then led the infrastructure—public 
research consortia— responsible for advancing Taiwan’s micron technology. Dr. Yang led ERSO 
during the upgrading of the transferred RCA micron technology from 7 micron to 1 micron 
technology. The connections of the returnees facilitated Taiwan’s initial tech transfers— such as 
Dr. Pan’s connections to RCA where he preciously had worked—helping ERSO and Taiwan with 
their first steps towards creating their own semiconductor manufacturing technology.  
 Following the spinoffs of UMC and TSMC, ethnic Chinese U.S- based engineers began 
returning to Taiwan in large numbers to join one of Taiwan's new promising semiconductor firms 
or found their own. Taiwan’s market was notably more attractive than other similar East Asian 
late developers as new small and medium sized firms were common in Taiwan. As a result, 
founding a new semiconductor or high-tech firm in Taiwan had significantly lower barriers for 
entry than States like Japan and Korea where the majority of IC and high-tech activity occurred 
within a few massive conglomerates. Additionally, generous financial tax loop-holes and 
subsidizes allowed Taiwan’s semiconductor firms to offer attractive compensation packages, 
which often included equity in the company for top-management positions. While these 
incentives successfully attracted top foreign talent to Taiwan, one may question how necessary 
these incentives were. Bai Xianyong’s short story “Winter Nights” suggest that many returnees 
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may have returned to Taiwan in order to give back to their home country and re-establish close 
connections with former classmates from childhood and early adulthood. Dr. Pan and Dr. Yang 
both returned to aid Taiwan’s infant industry without any guarantee for significant returns. While 
not directly attributable to the State’s generous tax loopholes for the top returnee technical talent, 
during the period of semiconductor development in Taiwan according to the website statistics 
(1980-2018), the Gini coefficient, a measurement of societal inequality, increased from below 30 
in the 1980s to 33.8 as of 2018. Despite Taiwan's technological upgrade and significant 
economic growth, Taiwan's society is no exception to rising global inequality. Further research 
on the relationship between State sponsored tax loopholes and subsides and societal inequality 
measurements must be done in order evaluate whether or not the two are directly related.   
 Almost a majority of Taiwan’s semiconductor industry leadership is at least in part made 
up by foreign returnees. Leaders like Miin Wu, Morris Chang, and Dr. Ding Yuan Yang armed 
with knowledge of industry trends, technical know-how and managerial experience helped guide 
their firms to achieving high levels of specialization in an innovative yet complementary role to 
the existing semiconductor industry, primarily in the United States. Without the contributions of 
these foreign returnees, finding a niche in the global division of labor might have proven too 
challenging for domestic producers without an in-depth knowledge of the existing industry 
practices and patterns.  
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A Rising Competitor: China’s Push for Semiconductor Dominance 
 In 2015, China launched an ambitious technological advancement initiative called ‘Made 
In China 2025.’ A large part of this initiative is China's attempt to create an entire semiconductor 
supply chain—from design to fabrication to testing and assembly—within China's borders.  As 131
summarized above, there are many lessons and policies China could borrow from Taiwan’s 
successful high-tech late-developer model; however, Taiwan's industry never aimed to become a 
direct competitor to the incumbent IC firm’s in the United States. Additionally, Taiwan's 
entrepreneurs, engineers and capitalists have already played a significant role in bringing talent, 
venture capital and foreign direct investment to China. Many of the same Ethnic Chinese 
technology associations which helped facilitate cross-regional connections in Taiwan, like the 
Chinese Institute of Engineers and the Chinese American Semiconductor Professional 
Association (CASPA), maintain similar services for mainland Chinese engineers.   132
 China has established multiple high-tech parks similar to the style of Taiwan’s Hsinchu 
Science Based Park. For example, the Zhangjiang High-Tech Park in Shanghai is China’s largest 
park with significant investments from foreign enterprises. As of 2011, the Park attracted 
significant FDI investments, but was not as successful at achieving significant tech-transfers to 
Chinese domestic firms as Taiwan.  There were vast technological gaps between the foreign 133
and domestic firms within the Park, and as seen in Taiwan, firms with dramatically lower 
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technology capabilities are less likely to receive tech transfers and patent cross-license 
agreements.  
 The difference in geopolitical circumstances between China and Taiwan at the times they 
pursued tech transfers from abroad are significantly different. Taiwan, as an island nation of only 
24 million, never represented a significant challenger to America’s global technological, 
political, and economic hegemony. Perhaps, as a result of Taiwan's relatively weak geopolitical 
status and lack of capital, Taiwan's industry was forced to seek out a complementary role within 
the global semiconductor division of labor rather than pursue the highest value-added segments 
of the semiconductor supply chain. American firms making deals with Taiwanese firms in the 
90s and early 2000s shifted part of the United State’s high-tech economy, but at the time 
outsourcing was a business norm that did not raise questions relating to political issues, like 
national security.  On the other hand, China is a nation that is increasingly recognized as global 
economic leader and a challenger to U.S geopolitical and economic authority. China has large 
quantities of capital resources to challenge any incumbent high-value added and capital intensive 
industry. For example, China’s National Integrated Circuit Fund recently raised over $29 billion 
dollars from different State sources. As a result, a comparison to Taiwan is limited in that the two 
operate under different economic conditions and the capital constraints that held back Taiwan do 
not exist for China. Further comparative analysis between Taiwan and China’s semiconductor 
development models may yield conclusions on the likelihood of China achieving the 
technological cutting edge in semiconductors and creating an entire industry ecosystem within 
one country.  
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